

**A-level
HISTORY
7042/2P**

Component 2P The Transformation of China, 1936–1997

Mark scheme

June 2021

Version: 1.0 Final



Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

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Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the average performance for the level. There are marks in each level.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start at the lowest level of the mark scheme and use it as a ladder to see whether the answer meets the descriptor for that level. The descriptor for the level indicates the different qualities that might be seen in the student's answer for that level. If it meets the lowest level then go to the next one and decide if it meets this level, and so on, until you have a match between the level descriptor and the answer. With practice and familiarity you will find that for better answers you will be able to quickly skip through the lower levels of the mark scheme.

When assigning a level you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest. If the answer covers different aspects of different levels of the mark scheme you should use a best fit approach for defining the level and then use the variability of the response to help decide the mark within the level, ie if the response is predominantly Level 3 with a small amount of Level 4 material it would be placed in Level 3 but be awarded a mark near the top of the level because of the Level 4 content.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. The descriptors on how to allocate marks can help with this. The exemplar materials used during standardisation will help. There will be an answer in the standardising materials which will correspond with each level of the mark scheme. This answer will have been awarded a mark by the Lead Examiner. You can compare the student's answer with the example to determine if it is the same standard, better or worse than the example. You can then use this to allocate a mark for the answer based on the Lead Examiner's mark on the example.

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other valid points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded no marks.

Section A

- 0 1** With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these three sources to an historian studying China's dealings with its neighbours in the years 1949 to 1952.

[30 marks]*Target: AO2*

Analyse and evaluate appropriate source material, primary and/or contemporary to the period, within the historical context.

Generic Mark Scheme

- L5:** Shows a very good understanding of all three sources in relation to both content and provenance and combines this with a strong awareness of the historical context to present a balanced argument on their value for the particular purpose given in the question. The answer will convey a substantiated judgement. The response demonstrates a very good understanding of context. **25-30**
- L4:** Shows a good understanding of all three sources in relation to both content and provenance and combines this with an awareness of the historical context to provide a balanced argument on their value for the particular purpose given in the question. Judgements may, however, be partial or limited in substantiation. The response demonstrates a good understanding of context. **19-24**
- L3:** Shows some understanding of all three sources in relation to both content and provenance together with some awareness of the historical context. There may, however, be some imbalance in the degree of breadth and depth of comment offered on all three sources and the analysis may not be fully convincing. The answer will make some attempt to consider the value of the sources for the particular purpose given in the question. The response demonstrates an understanding of context. **13-18**
- L2:** The answer will be partial. It may, for example, provide some comment on the value of the sources for the particular purpose given in the question but only address one or two of the sources, or focus exclusively on content (or provenance), or it may consider all three sources but fail to address the value of the sources for the particular purpose given in the question. The response demonstrates some understanding of context. **7-12**
- L1:** The answer will offer some comment on the value of at least one source in relation to the purpose given in the question but the response will be limited and may be partially inaccurate. Comments are likely to be unsupported, vague or generalist. The response demonstrates limited understanding of context. **1-6**
- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

Indicative content

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Students must deploy knowledge of the historical context to show an understanding of the relationship between the sources and the issues raised in the question, when assessing the significance of provenance, the arguments deployed in the sources and the tone and emphasis of the sources. Descriptive answers which fail to do this should be awarded no more than Level 2 at best. Answers should address both the value and the limitations of the sources for the particular question and purpose given.

Source A: in assessing the value of this source, students may refer to the following:

Provenance, tone and emphasis

- Mao was the undisputed leader of the CCP and in a position of almost absolute power in 1950. Even though Zhou Enlai was Foreign Minister, the decisions about Chinese foreign policy were in Mao's hands, so the source is valuable in showing the unequivocal Chinese position at the time
- in early 1950, the Chinese struggle against the GMD was only just complete and pockets of GMD resistance remained. Foreign influence remained on Chinese soil and its international position was precarious, so the source has value in showing CCP attempts to overcome this
- given that Mao is visiting the USSR at the time the message was sent, he was working under time pressure ('leave for Leningrad tomorrow') and Mao will therefore restrict himself to dealing with only the most pressing matters
- the tone is frank, valuable as Mao is sharing his open and honest views with one of the other senior officials of the CCP and far more openly than would be shared with the wider Party or with the public.

Content and argument

- China is beginning to flex its diplomatic muscles, having made the decision to move against Western possession on Chinese soil ('confiscate all American property'). This is hardly surprising given China's decision to 'lean to one side' in foreign policy and American attitudes to Communism and support for the GMD (even though this had waned in 1949). These anti-American attitudes would coalesce around the 'Resist America, Aid Korea' campaign between 1950 and 1951
- China is seeking a close relationship with the Soviet Union, with Mao having visited the USSR within weeks of the Civil War ending and taking advice from the Russian Foreign Minister. Again, this is unsurprising, as China lacked overseas allies and Mao was attempting to negotiate an alliance with Stalin during his visit, with high expectations of what could be achieved
- a major focus of PRC foreign policy, in early 1950, was to gain international recognition and China's seat on the UN Security Council. This was unlikely and overly optimistic, as the GMD regime that had occupied Taiwan had Western recognition as the legitimate government of China. The source hints at, but does not show, the full extent of China's hostility towards Taiwan, with Mao actively planning to invade the island. This hostility had grown by 1952 as the aims for recognition Mao expresses here were thwarted in the UN
- in fact, Mao's visit to Russia did not go as planned. A treaty was not finalised during the visit and Mao felt personally slighted by his cold treatment at the hands of the Russians, and the trip was a source of tension between the two powers that had deepened by 1952.

Source B: in assessing the value of this source, students may refer to the following:

Provenance, tone and emphasis

- as Soviet Ambassador, Roschin was responsible for both maintaining relations between Russia and China and ensuring that his superiors received the most accurate information possible in order to make decisions, so the source is highly valuable in being a trustworthy account of his meeting with Mao
- by late 1950, a crisis had arisen on the Korean peninsula; at Stalin's behest, the Communist North Koreans had invaded the South, and action which by early October had resulted in US forces pushing back into North Korea and very close to China's border
- the emphasis is on the urgency of the international situation, with matters moving quickly and Roschin responding almost immediately after his meeting to advise his government of Mao's intentions, and demands
- the tone is precise; it is Roschin's role to provide an accurate account of his meeting and the source avoids any opinionated comment. Its unflattering comments on China's position belies the top-secret nature of the document.

Content and argument

- Mao is following an aggressive policy towards Korea and military action by the PRC is imminent ('it will go to war now'). The presence of the US army so close to China left Mao with little alternative and in fact PRC 'volunteers' were already operating in Korea in large numbers
- the relationship between the two powers is unequal, with Mao voicing a deferential agreement with Stalin's position and heartened by apparent Soviet support. The Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty concluded earlier in the year is a good example of the unequal relationship between the two nations and has been likened to the old 'unequal treaties' of China's past. This contributed to a deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations by 1952 that the source does not fully reflect
- the Chinese military is not well supplied and Mao is dependent on Soviet military assistance. Indeed, China's successes in the Korean War were through sheer weight of numbers and the Red Army was also committed to a number of 'liberation campaigns' at the same time, which stretched it thinly
- in fact, Soviet support for China was far less than the hopes Mao expresses in the source, and China found itself fighting the US and their allies in Korea without Soviet assistance on the ground. It is claimed Stalin wanted to see China weakened by the conflict in Korea, had no intention of joining the war, and Soviet aid had to be paid for 'down to the last bullet'.

Source C: in assessing the value of this source, students may refer to the following:

Provenance, tone and emphasis

- as a victim of the Chinese treatment of Tibetans, the monk is able to provide evidence unavailable in the West at the time, and written some decades later shows the strong ongoing feelings around China's occupation of Tibet
- by 1952, China was consolidating its hold on the region, following the invasion of 1950 which met with stiff resistance from poorly armed but determined Tibetans
- the emphasis of the source is on how comprehensively the Chinese violated Tibetan tradition through oppression and fear, even in its most distant regions. That the monk represents the religious group most notoriously persecuted by Chinese forces gives the source additional value
- the tone is concerned; valuable as it shows the fear of the Tibetan people at the consequences of the Chinese invasion and occupation.

Content and argument

- China had begun a military occupation of Tibet ('the growing Chinese presence') in order to bring it under Communist control as an 'autonomous region', valuable in showing how China was projecting its power beyond its borders. The source also has value showing how extensive the occupation was, in that it reached such a small village
- China was proceeding to erode Tibetan culture and stamp Communist authority on the region, as seen by the agitprop 'shows and film' and the Communist badges given to the monks. Tibet had long regarded itself as independent and the source is valuable in showing the lengths the government was having to go to in order to achieve its goals
- Chinese actions in Tibet amounted to terror and caused fear among the population; the monk claims 'Tibetans were already afraid' and he himself was imprisoned. Whilst the source does make reference to 'protests' it does not make reference to the stiff resistance the Tibetans put up in Lhasa, which in turn resulted in the terror that the source describes
- in fact, the source only goes so far in showing China's actions against states it regarded as belonging under Communist control. Similar action was taken the same year in Xinjiang and Guangdong, and Mao even planned to mount a full-scale invasion of Taiwan.

Section B

- 0 2** 'The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) social policies, in the years 1952 to 1962, damaged Chinese society.'

Assess the validity of this view.

[25 marks]

Target: AO1

Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Generic Mark Scheme

- L5:** Answers will display a very good understanding of the full demands of the question. They will be well-organised and effectively delivered. The supporting information will be well-selected, specific and precise. It will show a very good understanding of key features, issues and concepts. The answer will be fully analytical with a balanced argument and well-substantiated judgement. **21-25**
- L4:** Answers will display a good understanding of the demands of the question. It will be well-organised and effectively communicated. There will be a range of clear and specific supporting information showing a good understanding of key features and issues, together with some conceptual awareness. The answer will be analytical in style with a range of direct comment relating to the question. The answer will be well-balanced with some judgement, which may, however, be only partially substantiated. **16-20**
- L3:** Answers will show an understanding of the question and will supply a range of largely accurate information, which will show an awareness of some of the key issues and features, but may, however, be unspecific or lack precision of detail. The answer will be effectively organised and show adequate communication skills. There will be a good deal of comment in relation to the question and the answer will display some balance, but a number of statements may be inadequately supported and generalist. **11-15**
- L2:** The answer is descriptive or partial, showing some awareness of the question but a failure to grasp its full demands. There will be some attempt to convey material in an organised way, although communication skills may be limited. There will be some appropriate information showing understanding of some key features and/or issues, but the answer may be very limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some, but limited, comment in relation to the question and statements will, for the most part, be unsupported and generalist. **6-10**
- L1:** The question has not been properly understood and the response shows limited organisational and communication skills. The information conveyed is irrelevant or extremely limited. There may be some unsupported, vague or generalist comment. **1-5**
- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

Indicative content

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Arguments supporting the view that the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) social policies, in the years 1952 to 1962, damaged Chinese society might include:

- traditionally affluent members of Chinese society suffered under CCP policies. By 1953, land reform had eliminated the landlord class, and in the cities, ongoing action against 'rightists' such as the Anti Hu Feng and Anti Rightist Campaigns caused untold damage among intellectuals in Chinese society, with around half a million exiled to the countryside
- the policy of collectivisation reversed many of the gains peasants had enjoyed in the early years of CCP rule in China. Advanced agricultural producers' co-operatives required peasants to give up the land and property they had gained from early Communist land reform and, in retaliation, many peasants destroyed their possessions rather than surrender them to the Advanced APCs, causing damage to the structure of rural society
- the lives of many Chinese women were damaged by social policies that were intended to benefit them. Rather than free rural women, Communist reforms placed further pressures on women; they now had to participate in earning work points, for example, as well as carry out many of their traditional duties within the family. This 'double burden' took a significant toll on women, especially pregnant women, in the later part of the period
- traditional family life was damaged by living in the communes. The introduction of communal mess halls, nurseries and retirement homes eroded long established family values, such as filial piety, and this caused huge damage during the famine when the bonds of obligation to care for the young and the elderly had weakened, resulting in starvation and infanticide
- ultimately, the commune system caused untold damage to the Chinese peasants; the strict controls on the work peasants carried out led to poverty as traditional handicrafts died out, and loss of agricultural productivity led to huge famines between 1958 and 1961. Millions died and, in many places, rural society all but disintegrated.

Arguments challenging the view that the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) social policies, in the years 1952 to 1962, damaged Chinese society might include:

- there were significant improvements to education in this period. The CCP simplified the Mandarin language and embarked on a national literacy drive. By the mid-1950s, over four million adults had been declared new literate, and provision of primary school education for children was widespread. Compared to previous governments, the CCP made genuine attempts to educate the Chinese people, which improved rather than damaged society
- although there were added burdens in the countryside, Communist policies towards women were transformational in the way women were regarded in Chinese society. They could no longer be traded as property, were able to divorce their husbands, and were able to participate in politics, making up around 13% of CCP membership. Though progress was slow, the position of women improved
- collectivisation was not disastrous to the poorest peasants, who found some advantages to the system. Those who worked below subsistence level were aided by the pooling of land in the Advanced APCs, and in the communes themselves from the communal canteens and care for the elderly
- CCP social campaigns, in the years 1952–1962, improved aspects of Chinese society. There were genuine attempts to prevent disease, such as the work of the Patriotic Health Campaign, which introduced a programme of vaccination and significantly reduced disease in the cities, where more hospitals were established.

Whilst it is fair to say that not all Communist policies damaged Chinese society, and intentions towards education and women were genuine and saw improvement especially in the cities, on balance the huge damage caused by CCP policies in rural China outweighed these. Given how the vast majority of China was rural, CCP policies were on balance disastrous for Chinese society.

- 0 3** To what extent did Mao Zedong's influence in China weaken in the years 1962 to 1965?
[25 marks]

Target: AO1

Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

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- L3:** Answers will show an understanding of the question and will supply a range of largely accurate information, which will show an awareness of some of the key issues and features, but may, however, be unspecific or lack precision of detail. The answer will be effectively organised and show adequate communication skills. There will be a good deal of comment in relation to the question and the answer will display some balance, but a number of statements may be inadequately supported and generalist. **11-15**
- L2:** The answer is descriptive or partial, showing some awareness of the question but a failure to grasp its full demands. There will be some attempt to convey material in an organised way, although communication skills may be limited. There will be some appropriate information showing understanding of some key features and/or issues, but the answer may be very limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some, but limited, comment in relation to the question and statements will, for the most part, be unsupported and generalist. **6-10**
- L1:** The question has not been properly understood and the response shows limited organisational and communication skills. The information conveyed is irrelevant or extremely limited. There may be some unsupported, vague or generalist comment. **1-5**
- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

Indicative content

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Arguments supporting the view that Mao Zedong's influence in China weakened in the years 1962 to 1965 might include:

- in terms of day-to-day government, Mao no longer took an active role in a way very different to the 1950s, and this can be seen to have weakened his position. By his own admission, he had retreated to the 'second line' of politics, and in 1965 even moved to Shanghai away from Beijing, the political hub of the PRC
- economic policy no longer followed Mao's ideas between 1962 and 1965, showing that his ideological influence over the CCP had diminished. Liu and Deng adopted a more pragmatic and centralised approach to economic planning, contrasting with Mao's belief in economic development through mass mobilisation of the Chinese people. The commune system so central to Mao's ideas was dismantled. That Mao began to criticise this as a 'capitalist road' shows that even he realised his power and control had diminished
- Mao was not involved in some of the key actions and decisions made by Liu Shaoqi between 1962 and 1965, showing his lack of influence and so the weakening of his position. Liu took steps to rehabilitate intellectuals in China without consulting Mao and although Mao himself had pressed for the Socialist Education Movement, Liu used it to impose government control rather than seeking change from the people, as Mao had intended
- there was criticism of Mao during this period that could not have occurred before 1962. In 1962, for example, the 7000 Cadres Conference was critical of the damage caused by the Great Leap Forward, and Mao even delivered a speech of self-criticism. The popular play 'Hai Rui Dismissed from Office' was seen by many as an allegory of Mao's unfair treatment of Peng Dehuai. This treatment of Mao serves to show the weakening of his influence between 1962 and 1965.

Arguments challenging the view that Mao Zedong's influence in China weakened in the years 1962 to 1965 might include:

- although Mao had less involvement in the daily running of the PRC, he retained significant influence and power, was still Chairman of the CCP, and was behind several mass campaigns launched between 1962 and 1965 that promoted his ideology. The 'Learn from Dazhai in Agriculture' campaign, launched in 1963, contrasted with the policy of dismantling the communes, for example, and the 'Learn From Lei Feng' campaign also promoted a Maoist line
- Mao's personality cult grew between 1962 and 1965 and this strengthened his influence over many in the CCP and among the wider population. It was Mao's picture, rather than that of Liu or Deng, that decorated workplaces and between 1964–65 millions of copies of 'Quotations of Chairman Mao' had been distributed. Mao's cult meant that he was seen across China as the most important figure in the CCP regardless of current government policies
- Mao's influence over the PLA did not weaken and if anything strengthened between 1962 and 1965. Lin Biao defended Mao's record at the 7000 Cadre Conference and remained loyal to Mao, reorganising the PLA along Maoist ideas of command. Whilst Mao may have lost some of his daily influence in government, he continued to rely on the loyalty of the army
- in addition to the PLA, Mao retained significant allies and developed new ones between 1962 and 1965. His Secretary, Chen Boda, remained an influential figure, and in 1965 the CCRG was established, containing Jiang Qing and other radical supporters of Mao. Though Mao had retreated from the 'first line' of politics, his allies and supporters had considerable influence, meaning that Mao's ideas were never far from the forefront.

On the face of it, Mao's influence did weaken in China between 1962 and 1965 but this was something that Mao intended to happen. He retained the power to reverse the situation if he so chose, and indeed this was what was to come the following year with the advent of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Crucially, he still had control over the PLA, from which many of his other sources of power (the Little Red Book and Lei Feng) also originated, and it would be the PLA who would be central to restoring Mao during the Cultural Revolution.

0 4 'China's global influence by 1997 was primarily the result of its economic power.'

Assess the validity of this view.

[25 marks]

Target: AO1

Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

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- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

Indicative content

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Arguments supporting the view that China's global influence by 1997 was primarily the result of its economic power might include:

- Chinese economic growth, by 1997, had reached 8% per annum and had been largely created by Western investments in vast new cities like Shenzhen. Western economies had become increasingly reliant on trade with China in the 1990s and so China was increasingly part of the global economy, giving it global influence
- in 1994 the USA awarded China 'most favoured nation' status in trade, which acknowledged the importance of China as an economic world power. Clinton's 'de-linking' policy also demonstrated that the West was prepared to turn a blind eye to China's human rights record in exchange for increasing trade, giving China more power and influence both domestically and on the world stage
- China's membership of the IMF and World Bank in 1997 made it an integral part of the global economy that showed China's willingness to engage on the world stage, and World Bank investment in China further developed economic growth and international trade and influence
- China was also prepared to overlook historical disputes with other countries in return for increasing economic power, and its relationship with Japan is a good example. The Friendship Treaty of 1978 improved relations and Chinese influence in the region were driving by the economic advantages for both countries; by the mid-1990s, Japan was China's largest overseas trading partner
- in the late 1990s, China began a policy of investment in East Africa and this increased China's economic presence in the developing world and gave it greater international status and influence as an economic power.

Arguments challenging the view that China's global influence by 1997 was primarily the result of its economic power might include:

- China's permanent membership of the UN Security Council gave it international political status, and though rarely used, its veto gave it the ability to influence events on the world stage, such as in 1997 when it blocked American policy in Central America
- China's increasing military control in the Pacific Rim – for example, exploiting US military withdrawal from the Philippines and seizing part of the disputed Spratley Islands from Vietnam in 1998 – has increased China's global influence and status through military expansion rather than economics
- the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997 marked a decisive end to historic Western influence in China, and the terms of the handover were highly beneficial to Chinese interests. Being free of this historic Western role in China gave it more global influence
- the collapse of the USSR in 1991 increased China's international power, leaving it as the most powerful Communist country in the world. Russian withdrawal from the Pacific increased China's influence, and Deng's decision to follow a more open policy with the West than the USSR gave China increased international importance.

Whilst there are other reasons why China had global influence by 1997, economic factors were indeed paramount, and influenced many of the other reasons for China's rise on the world stage. For example, the return of Hong Kong brought Asia's most prosperous city into Chinese control and control of the Pacific Rim gave China more control over trade in the region, especially coal and oil, vital for China's further economic expansion.